From paperwork to payload redirects: how digitized freight became a new crime scene
A pallet vanishing off a warehouse floor once signaled an inside job, yet the new tell is a clean API call that updates a route just in time to redirect the truck, leaving the dock crew none the wiser and the manifest perfectly consistent. Logistics digitization transformed bidding platforms, tracking portals, ePOD, and customs APIs into a seamless operating fabric, but that same connective tissue created an exposed attack surface where cyber access can move physical goods. The connective trust intended to accelerate commerce now doubles as a pathway to orchestrate modern theft without breaking any locks.
This matters more than ever because recent Proofpoint research in 2025 documented organized crews using legitimate access to bid on loads, impersonate carriers, and intercept high‑value inventory before retailers receive it. The campaigns relied on low‑noise tools and business‑as‑usual traffic, which means the signals hide in workflow behavior rather than in malware signatures. What follows is a roundup of perspectives on how the playbook works—entry through remote tools, API and partner abuse, privilege escalation—and which controls actually stopped real losses.
Moreover, the experts converge on a pragmatic conclusion: detection must shift from catching code to interpreting intent. That shift reframes security as an operational discipline, where the integrity of a bid, a route, or a delivery confirmation is guarded as tightly as any network segment.
Inside the playbook: how attackers turn API trust into physical loss
From foothold to false freight: RMM-led intrusions that pass as routine IT
Multiple security teams observed the same opening gambit: phishing lures, exposed portals, or partner pathways grant enough access to deploy legitimate remote monitoring and management. ScreenConnect, SimpleHelp, PDQ Connect, Fleetdeck, N‑able, and LogMeIn Resolve appeared repeatedly, with some crews chaining PDQ Connect to install both ScreenConnect and SimpleHelp for redundancy. Once inside, attackers ran WebBrowserPassView to vacuum stored browser passwords, then fanned out to brokerage, TMS, and carrier portals with authentic credentials.
From an operations desk, the activity looked like normal maintenance—agents checking endpoints, remote sessions during off‑hours, familiar executables. That camouflage gave persistence and stealth, frustrating endpoint tools tuned for malware and leaving web application firewalls blind because requests came from expected devices and IP ranges. The roundup view is clear: governance of RMM tooling, not just blocking bad binaries, is now a frontline control.
In contrast with classic intrusion narratives, the objective here was not to drop ransomware but to prepare for commerce: capture accounts, stage access across partners, and position to interact with freight workflows as a trusted user. The subtlety was the feature, not a flaw, and it let criminals act within SLAs rather than against them.
Business logic under siege: bending carrier bids, routes, and delivery confirmations
On the API front, leaders at Cequence Security emphasized that logistics APIs encode process intent—onboarding carriers, bidding for loads, pushing route updates, exchanging customs data, and issuing ePOD. Abuse rarely looks syntactically invalid; it mirrors valid traffic with slight deviations in sequence, timing, or volume. That nuance let adversaries impersonate carriers, reroute destinations, and finalize deliveries on paper while trucks rolled somewhere else.
Risk concentrated where inventory was liquid and valuable. Apple shipments stood out because demand, traceability, and resale velocity aligned, and brokerage marketplaces amplified the stakes by compressing timeframes and multiplying counterparties. The roundup consensus held that this is not a vulnerability in code; it is a vulnerability in process logic exposed through APIs that faithfully do what they are told.
Therefore, defenders who relied solely on WAF signatures or rate limits missed the signal. What mattered was whether a route change occurred after an unusual bid sequence, or whether ePOD confirmations clustered at atypical hours from fresh devices. Intent, not just input validation, became the differentiator.
Speed, scale, and soft spots: when operational urgency becomes the attack vector
Experts across carriers and brokers flagged the same soft spot: time pressure windows. Slot bookings, last‑minute route updates, and after‑hours approvals created coverage gaps where a well‑timed request sailed through. In those moments, step‑up checks felt like friction, so organizations traded certainty for speed—and attackers planned around that reflex.
Regional nuances deepened complexity. Port identity checks varied, cross‑border customs APIs enforced different data proofs, and partner maturity ranged from cloud‑first to spreadsheet‑driven. This uneven landscape gave adversaries room to replay techniques in the least prepared corridors while blending into normal variance elsewhere.
In response, the field moved toward intent‑aware monitoring: baselining normal API sequences, scoring anomalies by business risk, and aligning alerts to operational priorities. The pivot reflected a broader shift from perimeter thinking to workflow‑centric defense that reads the narrative of a shipment, not just the packets.
Privilege is the fulcrum: session elevation and identity proofing decide who moves the cargo
Keeper Security’s perspective placed privileged access at the pivot point between breach and loss. If an attacker elevated access within brokerage or TMS portals, they could alter routes, approve carrier changes, or close out deliveries—converting a quiet intrusion into missing merchandise. Privileged Access Management emerged as the brake pedal, constraining actions, requiring step‑up verification for sensitive changes, and terminating risky sessions on signal.
Some organizations trusted “known” tools and IP ranges, betting that familiarity equalized to safety. The roundup showed that approach faltered once legitimate RMM or shared infrastructure became the adversary’s cloak. Least privilege and continuous session analytics, by contrast, narrowed blast radius and surfaced misuse even when credentials and tools were legitimate.
Looking ahead from an operations lens, identity assurance for carriers—attestation tied to devices, routes, and context—paired with risk‑scored approvals promised a path to keep urgent freight moving without handing adversaries a free pass.
What to do now: concrete controls to keep shipments—and systems—on course
The central takeaway cut through every interview: cyber intrusion now precedes physical theft, and the decisive battlegrounds are APIs and privileged access. Traditional controls still matter, but they are not enough when the crime mimics normal business.
An immediate plan emerged. First, elevate API security by inventorying logistics‑facing interfaces, baselining typical sequences, and alerting on logic abuse and abnormal frequencies. Next, harden identity with least privilege, deploy PAM across brokerage, TMS, and carrier portals, and enforce strong MFA for brokers and partners. Moreover, govern remote access by restricting RMM usage, detecting unsanctioned installs and tool chaining, and recording sessions behind allowlists.
Operations teams then validated business logic with step‑up verification for bids, route edits, and delivery changes, and enforced dual control during time‑critical windows. Finally, credential hygiene mattered: limit browser‑stored passwords, rotate credentials after incidents, and hunt for artifacts of credential harvesting to collapse dwell time.
Practical application depended on SecOps and operations working as one. They defined normal workflows together, built guardrails that preserved SLAs, and measured outcomes with fraud‑loss and diversion metrics rather than generic alert counts.
The road ahead: securing movement, not just networks
The roundup reinforced a simple message: protecting goods in motion required safeguarding the APIs, identities, and sessions that orchestrate movement. Partner risk management broadened, analytics centered on intent, and regulators pushed for deeper observability in logistics APIs as companies recalibrated controls toward the workflows that actually moved freight.
Across sources, the most durable lesson was operational: treat API misuse and privilege abuse as threats to fulfillment, not just to IT. Teams that translated that mindset into step‑up checks, PAM guardrails, and behavior‑based monitoring reported fewer diversions and faster interdictions. For readers seeking more depth, the next step sat in playbooks that map business logic end to end, tie identity signals to action risk, and align alerts to the value and urgency of shipments.
This discussion ultimately showed that the heist now looked like business as usual until the last mile went silent, and the organizations that prevailed had already tuned defenses to the story their APIs and sessions told.
